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The appellant addressed two main issues in this appeal: 1 Denial of due process
by the Court's action of allowing the hearing regarding the motion in limine and the
filing of the formal complaint on the morning of jury trial; 2- Denial of due process by
the Court's erroneous rulings on matters oflaw and evidence. Either of these two matters
standing alone is sufficient to grant the relief requested, the cumulative effect of the two
issues mandates that the withheld judgment be vacated and the case remanded for a new
trial.

ARGUMENT

Tomlinson will sequentially address the matters as set out in BRIEF OF
RESPONDENT.
In the STA TEMENT OF THE CASE, the state uses three pages to outline the
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various continuances of the jury trial requested and received by the defense. The number
of continuances and length of time are not relevant to the main issue in Tomlinson's first
issue on appeal, when the formal complaint was actually filed and when the magistrate
ruled on the issue of per se DUI versus the non per se DUI of which Tomlinson had

I
I

I
I
I

notice up to and including the morning of jury trial.
The state argues that the record reflects that three weeks prior to the trial, the
parties discussed when the magistrate would hear the state's motion in limine. What the
record actually reflects is that the prosecutor stated her "recollection" that a conversation
was held in chambers concerning when the motion was to be heard, and her recollection
was it would be taken up right before trial, (JT Tr p 11, 119-18). The court's ambivalent
response is not dispositive as to the timing or the efficacy of when and if the motion in
limine would be heard,

I

"THE COURT: Yeah. I-that was - that was what I stated. I

I typically would not take

that up beforehand, so.", (JT Tr p 11, 1123-25). Tomlinson's counsel disputed this fact

=
I
I
I
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and argued that his recollection was that the issue of witness costs would be argued on
the morning of trial, (JT Tr p 12, 111-5). The court then responded, "No. I said I was
going to entertain
So, I

I would entertain a motion for costs and I was likely to award those.

that's not what I said there.", (JT Tr p 12, 116-9). Tomlinson argues that the

magistrate's recollection of what happened in chambers is not sufficient for an official
record. The magistrate's statement," ... I typically would not take that up beforehand ... ",
(emphasis added), is not a definitive statement of what actually transpired, and implies
the judge was relying on his usual habits versus specific recollection. The
MAGISTRATE MINUTES / NOTICE OF HEARING I PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM,
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filed March 26, 2013, (Clerk's Record on Appeal, p 53), backs Tomlinson's argument.

le

The minutes state the court will entertain a motion for costs, and there is no entry about
motions in limine being heard on the morning of jury trial.
Tomlinson placed the state and Court on notice that the motions in limine had not

I
I
I
I
I

been either noticed for hearing or heard in the defendant's SECOND MOTION TO
CONTINUE JURY TRIAL filed March 25, 2013: 'The state filed a MOTION IN
LIMINE on March 1, 2013, that has not been heard by this Court. The state has not
requested a hearing on this MOTION, and consequently, the defendant has not received
notice of any hearing, (Clerk's Record on Appeal, p 51 & 52),
Once again, even if this Court would find that Tomlinson had sufficient notice,
notice of the existence of an issue- specifically the state's motion to proceed per se, is not
the same as a ruling by the court on whether the motion would be allowed. A defendant
should not have to guess and speculate whether an expert witness will be necessary. The

I

•
I
I
I
I

"alternative complaint 1" the state mentions was disclosed, but this matter was not noticed
for hearing until the morning of trial. The state is confusing "awareness" with the notice
required for due process.
The state lists the numerous hearing dates in their brief; the matter of per se could
have been noticed for hearing on any of these dates. The state did not ever provide
proper notice. The Court's practice of not having time to hear this type of motion also
violates due process. Once again, notice encompasses specific rulings from the Court on
the record, the defendant should not have to guess or speculate how the state intends to

The actual complaint was not filed until the morning of trial. It does not appear from
the record that the defendant was ever arraigned on the alternate complaint, which is also
a violation of due process.
1
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proceed. A defense expert witness retained to testify at jury trial costs a minimum of
$1,200 up to $5,000. The defendant was prejudiced by not having an expert to testify

concerning ascending BAC, unreliability of field sobriety tests, unreliability and margin
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of error on the Lifeloc fc 20, et al. Due to the fact the Court had not ruled that the state
would be able to proceed per se, the defendant had not scheduled and paid for an expert
witness. The ICR 16 requires the defendant to disclose expert witnesses, the defendant
was no in a position to know if experts would have been needed until there was a ruling
by the magistrate on the state's motion to proceed per se. The defendant requested a
continuance, which was denied.
The state argues that preparing a complaint listing per se DUI was sufficient and
complied with the terms of the Trial Status Memo. The triggering mechanism for the
judicial process is the filing, of a document, not the preparation. If the complaint had
been filed, the defendant would have had the opportunity to object and request to be
heard. The purpose of a complaint is to place a defendant on notice to trigger due process
so rulings can be obtained from the Court.

I
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The defendant was placed on notice of the language of 18-8004 by the citation.
The state argues language in the DUI statute places the defendant on notice that the state
can prove the violation per se. The defendant is allowed to present evidence to contest
the charges as set out in the statute. The state's motion in limine and the Court's ruling
precluded the defendant from presenting a defense. The state argues ad nauseam that the
defendant had sufficient notice so as to prepare a defense. The due process violation
resulted from the defendant being prohibited from presenting a defense through cross

I

I
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examination of the police officer concerning ascending BAC, field sobriety tests,
problems vvith the Lifeloc, et al.
Idaho Criminal Rule 45( c), (hereafter "ICR"), contains the language: '·and notice

8
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of hearing thereof, shall be served not later than seven (7) days before the time specified
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for the hearing ... ", (emphasis the author's). "Shall" is mandatory. As stated above, the
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state had myriad opportunities to notice the motion in limine for hearing. The state did
not cite ICR 4 7 when asking for the unscheduled hearing, the judge did not make findings
related to the exceptions in ICR 45 or ICR 47. Most significantly, the defendant made
the appropriate objections to the Court even conducting the hearing.
The state argues that the court is not required to rule on motions in limine prior to
trial and cites State v Hester, 114 Idaho 688 (1988), "The trial judge, in the exercise of
his discretion, may decide that it is inappropriate to rule in advance on the admissibility
of evidence based on a motion in limine, but may defer his ruling until the case unfolds
and there is a better record upon which to make his decision." This argument fails for two
reasons. The type of rulings referenced in the Hester case relate to rulings on specific
evidence, not state's broad intention to proceed on a per se basis. If the state is allowed to
proceed per se, the defense must make strategic decisions involving admissibility of
evidence and the scheduling and disclosing of expert witnesses.
These errors were not harmless- as stated above, the defendant was denied the
opportunity to put on a meaningful and thorough defense through cross examination of
the state's witnesses, and to utilize an expert witness to counter the state's case.
The state argues that the prosecution does not have to prove back extrapolation
for a breathe result to be admissible. The defendant attempted to introduce evidence

I
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pursuant to Sutliff, Robinett, and State v Juarez, 40135 (IDCCR, 11-12-13 ), and was
precluded by the Court's ruling on the state's motion in limine.
Tomlinson submits in support of this appeal the decision of the Honorable

I
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Cathleen MacGregor Irby, Magistrate Judge, in State of1daho vs. Cindy Sue Cravens,
filed August 30, 2012, 4th Judicial District, (copy attached), as non-precedential
argument. Tomlinson further argues that the evidence that would be allowed through
expert testimony in Judge MacGregor Irby's decision could have been placed in front of
the jury in the present case through Officer Frederick after establishing the proper
foundation.

CONCLUSION
The state cannot limit a defendant's ability to put on a defense by the way they
charge a crime. The state cannot utilize the holdings in a civil BAC case to deny a
defendant in a criminal case due process of law. The District Court sitting in an appellate
capacity should not have affirmed these findings.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
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By CAIVllLLE MITCHF:LL
DF.PIJTY

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
)
)
)
)
vs.
)
=C=in=d"-'-y--"S""'u""'e'--C=----ra~v..c.e=ns"----_ _ _ _ _~)
State of Idaho

Case No: CR-MD-2011-0013066

ORDER DENYING STATE'S
MOTION IN LIMINE

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Cindy Sue Cravens was arrested for misdemeanor Driving Under the Influence of
Alcohol, pursuant to LC. § 18-8004, after an officer administered a field sobriety and
breathalyzer test using the LifeLoc FC20. The results of this test produced a suspicion that Ms.
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Cravens was driving intoxicated, and the then administered breathalyzer test resulted in a
.081/.084 reading. Ms. Cravens seeks to introduce or elicit testimony regarding a general margin
of error in the breathalyzer equipment, however, the State has filed a Motion in Limine
requesting that the Court find such testimony irrelevant due to the recent decision in Elias-Cruz
v. Idaho Dept. of Transportation. This issue shall be considered below.

QUESTION PRESENTED
Under LC.§ 18~8004, does the recent Idaho Supreme Court decision in Elias-Cruz v.
Idaho Department of Transportation affect the ability of a defendant to present testimony on the
margin of error of the LifeLoc FC20 portable breathalyzer test when ~efending against a DUI
charge in a magistrate court?
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ANALYSIS

In a magistrate court in the state of Idaho, a defendant may produce or elicit testimony on
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whether a specific breathalyzer device was reliable at the time the test was taken, and it is up to
the factfinder to weigh such evidence in deciding whether reasonable doubt exists. Under Idaho
law, LC. § 18-8004, a person is guilty of the crime of driving under the influence of alcohol if
the person "is under the influence of alcohol ... or [] has an alcohol concentration of 0.08, as
defined in subsection (4) ... as shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or breath ... " It has been
held that this statute creates two ways by which the State can prove a violation, the first being to
show under the totality of the evidence that the defendant was driving under the influence and
the second that the defendant drove with an alcohol concentration over .08 percent or more. State

v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 112, 106 P.3d 436,438 (2004). Here, the State contends that
evidence of a general margin of error in breathalyzer equipment under the second theory (the per
se theory) is irrelevant due to the recent Idaho Supreme Court decision in Elias-Cruz v. Idaho

Department a/Transportation. 2012 Opinion No. 99, 2012 WL 2481632. However, analysis of
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the decision in Elias-Cruz and a survey of cases from Idaho and other jurisdictions yields the
conclusion that the Elias-Cruz decision is specific to considerations of administrative license
suspensions by hearing officers of the Idaho Department of Transportation.
Based on the cases cited, holding, and analysis in Elias-Cruz, the decision is specific to
evidentiary considerations by a hearing officer in cases before the Idaho Department of

I

Transportation for administrative license suspensions. Under Idaho Code section 18-8002A,

I

when a peace officer has legal cause to believe someone is driving while intoxicated and arrests

I

that person in violation of LC.§ 18-8004, the Idaho Department of Transportation can
automatically suspend that persons license for a certain period depending on the number of prior
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DUI offenses and suspensions. According to I.C. § 18-8002A(7), a person who's license has
been administratively suspended may request an evidentiary hearing. This evidentiary hearing is
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quite distinguishable from the criminal hearing to establish guilt of the misdemeanor: ( 1) the
burden of proof is on the party requesting the administrative hearing, (2) the hearing officer must
find grounds to vacate the suspension by a preponderance of the evidence, (3) the facts and
findings by the hearing officer are "independent of the determination of the same or similar facts
in the adjudication of any criminal charges arising out of the same occurrence", and (4) the
losing party can seek judicial review in the manner provided for judicial review of final agency
actions. Id In the case of Elias-Cruz, the defendant sought judicial review of the suspension of
her license by the Idaho Department of Transportation. Ms. Elias-Cruz contended that the
hearing officer erred by failing to consider evidence of a margin of error of the LifeLoc FC20
breathalyzer in weighing whether she had met her burden of proof to vacate the suspension. In
analyzing this issue, the cases considered by the Idaho Supreme Court were either specific to
administrative suspensions or concerned with the admissibility of evidence regarding tests for

I
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alcohol concentration. See McDaniel v. Idaho Department o/Transportation, 149 Idaho 643,239
P.3d 36 (Ct. App. 2010) (Holding that hearing officer did not have to take into account any
inherent error within breath test machine before license suspension); see also Robinett, 141 Idaho
at 113, 106 P .3d at 439 (Holding that evidence of blood alcohol content taken after lapse in time
of arrest did not make evidence inadmissible). Additionally, the decision is quite specific to
suspension of drivers licenses for persons under the age of 21, and the strong interests of the state
to do so under such circumstances.

Finally, although the court makes note that to establish a

"per se" criminal violation under this theory of the statute the state need not establish the "actual
alcohol concentration", this holding would not preclude the jury or judge from considering

3
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evidence of a margin of error in the specific device when deciding if the state has established its
prima facie case.
Although breathalyzer evidence is automatically admissible, the statute does not limit the
right of a defendant to introduce evidence to the jury relevant to "the weight and credibility of
such evidence, or to attack the reliability of both the test's results and the process utilized on that
defendant. State v. Van Sickle, 120 Idaho 99, 104, 813 P.2d 910,915 (Ct. App. 1991); see also

State v. Ward, 135 Idaho 400, 17 P.Jd 901 (Ct. App. 2001). When a jury instruction unduly
emphasized the approval by the police department of the Intoxilyzer 5000, the Idaho Court of
Appeals found reversible error because such instruction encroached on the State's burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a .10 reading at the time it was taken was correct. State

v. Winson, 129 Idaho 298, 301, 923 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Ct. App. 1996). In reaching its conclusion,
the court reasoned that "in light of the fact that the jury may have inferred that they need not
deliberate on the accuracy of the breath test in this case because it was settled by the magistrate's
instruction," the court committed harmful error by not allowing the jury to decide the ultimate
issue of the case regarding the per se violation of I. C. § 18-8004. Id Lending additional support
to this conclusion is the case of State v. Pres.mall, where the court held that a defendant charged
with driving under the influence of alcohol was entitled to present testimony from an expert
witness predicting his blood alcohol level at the time of the test to support the inference that a
breath alcohol reading from an Intoximeter 3000 was inaccurate. 119 Idaho 207, 211, 804 P.2d
936, 940 (Ct. App. 1991 ). More recently, in State v. Anderson, the court considered whether the
defendant was guilty of an enhanced DUI where the breathalyzer testing was inconsistent. 145
Idaho 99, 104, 175 P.3d 788, 793 (2008). The court reasoned that "it is within the province of
the jury to assign weight to conflicting evidence and credibility to testimony. Where the jury

4
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determined that the evidence presented proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the 0.22 and 0.24
test results were valid and that the 0.19 test result, although valid, should be disregarded." Id.
Additionally, the Idaho Court of Appeals and many other jurisdictions surveyed have recently
held in numerous situations that a defendant may produce evidence of the unreliability of a
specific breathalyzer test. See State v. Alford, 139 Idaho 595, 598, 83 P.3d 139, 142 (Ct. App.

I
I

2004) (Stating that defendant had not put forth any evidence demonstrating the reliability of a
specific breathalyzer); see State v. Finch, 291 Kan. 665,672,244 P. 3d 673,680 (2011) (Holding
that a per se violation theory in DUI case did not equate to establishment of the prima facie case
and evidence of margin of error in breathalyzer was relevant); see also State v. Kuhl, 276 Neb.
497,511, 755 N.W.2d 389,400 (2008) (Finding that defendant could present expert testimony
on margin of error but trial court could reject credibility where no studies existed to support a
margin of error of specific breathalyzer). Finally, perhaps the most recent and instructive Idaho
case is State v. Hardesty, where the defendant sought to introduce expe11 testimony on the
variability of the standard partition ratio in converting breath test to blood alcohol level. 136
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Idaho 707, 710, 39 P.3d 647,648 (Ct. App. 2002). In its analysis, the court found that a
defendant could not challenge a general element of the crime, but could challenge the reliability
and scientific methodology underlying the breathalyzer in considering whether the Intoxilyzer
5000 accurately measured his breath alcohol concentration at the time Hardesty's breath test was
administered. Id

,

In this case the Idaho Supreme Court decision in Elias-Cruz appears too distinguishable
to be controlling, however, limitations must be placed on the testimony Ms. Cravens provides or
elicits. To be consistent with Hardesty, Ward, and Pressnall this Court must limit expert
testimony to a margin of error specific to the LifeLoc FC20 that would affect the results at the
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time tests were taken from Ms. Cravens. For the expert testimony to be allowed, it must be
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credible in that it is a scientifically supported margin of error, and jury instructions must be
limiting as to the jury's job in determining the credibility of the breathalyzer results. In eliciting
testimony from the office on the margin of error, the court must be careful in steering away from
hearsay or credibility determinations that the officer may not be able to make with regards to the
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reliability of the LifeLoc FC20. Therefore, while Elias-Cruz is not controlling, the Defendant in
this case does not have free rein to put forth any evidence of general margins of error in every
breathal yzer test.
CONCLUSION
This court DENIES the State's Motion in Limine. This court also cautions the Defendant
as to the limiting nature of the testimony they can provide or elicit as per the parameters
mentioned above.
Dated this 30 th day of August. 2012.
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